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I have been teaching qualitative research in education at The Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem for some years now. I have a sense that dealing with the issues of research 
methodology is of importance if we do indeed consider anthropology and qualitative 
methods to have something to contribute to improve the world in which we live. 
I write this rather short note out of a commitment to empirical research in the social 
sciences, emphasizing that which is observed and experienced, and recognizing the 
complexity of studying that which is human. I reflect on my experience as a learner 
looking for ways to understand educational practice through methods able to capture its 
complexity. I then reflect on my experience as a teacher of anthropology and education, 
and consider the problems I encounter when trying to share my trade with my students. I 
hint at the potential connection between the political organizations within which we 
evolve and the paradigmtic perspectives which seem to become an obstacle in 
overcoming traditional empirical perspectives in the social sciences in general and in 
education in particular. Last, I consider multiple literacies as tools which might help us 
realize the problems mentioned and emphasize that these do not belong only in the world 
outside but also inside our immediate academic settings.  
What I want to say has been said before. Biologists (Mayr, 1988), philosophers 
(Churchman, 1968, 1979), and even plain anthropologists (Bateson, 1979) have long 
recognized the limits of the modern dream for omniscience mostly constrained by a 
system’s complexity, which will not easily bow to our traditional scientific tools. While it 
has all been said before, when looking around in the academy I wonder whether it need 
not be remembered once again. Our methodologies and methodological tools are central 
to this commitment and stand at the basis of the paradigms which guide our inquiry.  
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If guided by conventional quantitative positivist perspectives when pondering over these 
issues, I could be expected to seek new formulae so as, for example, to improve our 
dealings with more variables simultaneously, or to allow for better graphical 
representations of patterns of relationships, or, even better, to permit the improved 
investigation of small samples. By so doing, I would implicitly acknowledge that the 
researcher, given a good methodology, is almost irrelevant in the research equation. 
An empiricist I am but a positivist I am not. Working as I do in the anthropology of 
learning or education, I have for long been convinced that the customary scales and 
graphics produced by the social sciences offer poor representations of that which I study, 
i.e., humans learning, which, by the mere fact of being alive, is intermittent, always in 
flux and stubbornly refuses reification. I seem to stand alongside the biologists in the 
scientific wars of the old hard natural sciences who, when criticized by physicists for 
their “soft” scientific approach, would answer: What else can we do? What we study 
moves (Mayr, 1988). While physicist have, by now, removed themselves and their 
science from simplistic positivist stands when uncovering that relativity, uncertainty, and 
chaos govern that which they research, social scientists seem, for the most part, 
unfortunately not be able to overcome the traditional positivist paradigm which governed 
the physics of old. 
Alternatively I could be a “traditional” philosopher who, guided by modern western 
thought--which, in a nutshell, is said to be merely footnotes to Plato--engages in the 
trajectory which directly connects Plato and Descartes while trying, through the efforts of 
a solipsistic self, to uncover metaphysics in the shadows (as in the Platonic metaphor). 
But again biology comes to the rescue and I worry not about that which I have never 
seen, the individual mind/self, and rather align myself with the true empiricist of all 
times, Darwin, who in 1838 already knew, “He who understands baboon would do more 
towards metaphysics than Locke” (Charles Darwin, Notebook M: 84e, 16 August 1938, 
cited in Barrett, Gautrey, Herbert, Kohn, & Smith, 1987, p. 539). 
Either way I seem to follow that which is alive, and when so doing, have come to realize 
that that which is in need of bettering for our social research to move forward is not our 
methodologies nor the efforts of an individual mind, but instead we humans, the 
researchers ourselves. We are the ones who carry and implement the methodologies and 
analyses. 
I discovered anthropology as a discipline over 30 years ago when I was working as a 
young moderator at a voluntary organization offering seminars to high school students. I 
do not remember exactly why but I remember being curious about what the academy had 
to say about what my educational activity was, at that time. Reviewing traditional 
quantitative educational research, I had a sense that what was being offered in terms of 
results and interpretations did not at all reflect my own experience while working in the 
field. By chance I picked up Geertz’s book, The Interpretation of Cultures (Geertz, 
1973), read it and was seized in a dialogue with the complexity of understanding the 
living. 
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When compared to cause and effect relationships, the manipulation of variables, and 
generalizations, which did not at all mirror my sense of what I was doing in class, 
Geertz’s descriptions resonated with my complex experiences and offered a sense that 
there was a way of looking at what I was doing and of reflecting on my and my 
colleagues’ activities. Since then I have been trying to train my senses to meet the world 
and think about what I encounter in it through what I understand to be the traditional 
tools and paradigmatic perspectives that anthropology has to offer. 
Ten years ago, I started teaching qualitative methodology courses at the university; that is 
to say, I started failing at teaching others what had been so helpful to me, and for the 
most part failing to engage my students in a dialogue about the complexities of that which 
makes us human, i.e., our insatiable urge--indeed necessity--to learn. I would readily take 
all responsibility for my failure if I would believe that my rather weak teachings skills 
could carry all the blame. But I believe responsibility rests, partially at least, somewhere 
else; it rests in the many years of training that my students have endured in the 
institutions created by the sovereign state to inculcate them with a modern western 
ideology, one which rests on a positivist monologic paradigm that will justify their 
present grip and their future survival. The powerful machinery developed by the nation 
state, mostly in the shape of massive educational efforts (Gellner, 1997) which market 
universal and anonymous literacy, has been successful in making look natural or banal 
(Billig, 1995), the detailed practices through which nation states become real. Thus nation 
states become almost invisible settings in which we “mistakenly” hold a sense of 
individuality--an individuality always measured against a contingent other (Laclau, 1990) 
and thus intolerant of difference, and against that modern court of human appeal: the 
“high” culture of the nation state (Williams, 1961). 
A parallel may be drawn with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that attributes a powerful role 
to language in shaping our thoughts. Likewise, nationalism seems to shape and direct our 
most basic paradigmatic conceptions both of society and of individual identity. The 
discursive resources and practices it offers both express and reinforce its power. These 
resources point at the deep-rooted cultural schemes that organize the way we interpret our 
environments in verbal communication. Patterns of talk that are available to organize 
communicational processes of given groups through a mediating textual form embedded 
in the symbolic realm of a given social setting; in our case the setting shaped by the 
power of the nation-state through the ongoing constitution of the political field by two 
irreducible poles of essentialist determinacy (e.g., good/bad, particular/universal, 
Jew/Arab, etc.) (Neuman & Bekerman, 2001). 
Still it is not about who carries or shares the responsibility for my failure that I wish to 
talk; what I want to do is to try, at least, to point at what it is I could possibly want to 
achieve when trying to better the human in the researcher. This clarity is to me necessary 
because without it I cannot even start to organize my teaching in a way which, if allowed, 
would be successful. 
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Many (almost all) students of mine come expecting to get, without much difficulty, the 
credits needed to receive their degrees so as to join the lucky ones who might enter the 
race to achieve positions of power in the state bureaucracy which will allow for more 
than a rather minimalist survival in our consumerist society. They expect their teacher to 
offer a clear course of action, some straightforward formula which, if followed, promises 
success in the examination. I cannot blame them for this; I did much the same when I was 
a student.  
Nonetheless, I want them first to have an appreciation for theory. But they fear theory as 
if the word belongs only to those who can afford the time for reflective introspection. 
They react to theory as if they knew the word’s historical roots (from Greek theoros), 
which designated the clerks who were licensed by the sovereign to determine whether 
something had indeed taken place, to bear witness. Today’s students fear it as if they 
would have known the etymology throughout and realized that theory, thus understood, 
represents the power of the state. 
I would like my students, instead, to take seriously that we all beget theories while our 
lives unfold in the complex tasks the world relentlessly affords us. I want them to 
appreciate that there are multiple ways in which the world can be known, and a variety of 
languages through which reality can be described. Still as true heirs to years of shallow 
positivist thinking in the social sciences, they want to know how to uncover a true reality; 
they hope to find ways to describe it exactly so as, in the best of cases, to change it for the 
better. Even when I’m successful in showing that the realities they experience are far 
more complex than any answer they can expect to uncover through positivist 
perspectives, their expectations from research efforts do not change much. They still 
believe that good research should be able to offer a secure and easy path to a change for 
the better. If they are successful enough to join those in power, they know they will need 
first to be able to offer a convincing and sound analysis of reality, and later some clear, 
sharp conclusions as to how to act so as to change the reality described. The fact that 
education has gone unchanged in spite of the large amount of research conducted through 
the years seems not to bother them at all. They seem to think this to be so because that 
research has not yet been done properly, or, in the worst case, because its 
recommendations have not been properly implemented by the teachers, the curriculum 
writers, the principals, or the policy makers. 
When teaching them about us humans as the central tool of research, they doubt their 
potential to be objective, as if numerical manipulations could offer objective perspectives. 
When teaching them about using their senses to collect data through observing, 
interviewing, and gathering documentation, they fear their personal perspectives might 
contaminate an otherwise immune/sterilized research effort. But even when the tools are 
explained and adopted (for lack of any other option, while participating in a university 
course) they endlessly express insecurity regarding their understanding of what it is 
exactly that they should do and how to do it well. My continuing attempts to convince 
them that the human world of activity is complex and forever influenced by changing 
contexts and historical trajectories, only creates more tensions; they prefer rather to be 
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allowed to look for “facts” and “truths” but now armed with ethnographic tools. They 
become now a living questionnaire or a traveling laboratory site in which to uncover 
causality. 
When I insist on the complexities of human interaction, when I emphasize the multiple 
contextual levels of analysis that need to be accounted for (i.e., micro-, mezzo-, macro-, 
exo-), they lose patience. They insist that, if at all valid, what I expect would make the 
research process irrelevant for it would be too time consuming or in a sense made 
frivolous for it denies the possibility of making any clear statements on what to do next. 
When I ask my students to suspend, for a moment, their search for what stands behind 
what they are looking at--the transcendent, the unconscious, the intentional, and the 
unintentional--and instead to pay attention to the richness of the material as this is 
expressed in the physical and the verbal realms, they are annoyed as if I would be 
denying their and their “research subjects’” humanity. They seem to believe it is much 
more human to judge, to interpret a situation according to the observer’s perception of 
that which is totally unavailable to the observer--that which the subjects think. As our 
worst enemies, they fancy more our intentions than our deeds. At times I fear they are the 
true (hopefully unintentional) heirs of a psychologized essentialized worldview whose 
relations to the development of the nation state seem to be unknown to them (Foucault, 
1969, 1973).  
Engaging in a critical dialogue with these perspectives is no easy task. Still, in recent 
years it has become a central focus in my teaching activity. It mainly involves re-
presenting science as relative and arbitrary while trying to construct new means of seeing 
other aspects of constructed realities. Human understanding is not mere representation--
linguistic, mathematical, visual, or auditory; understanding is the exercise of proficiency. 
We understand a thing when we know how to interact with it and use it well. Though we 
have classically been taught that science is driven by the formulation of hypotheses and 
by experiments designed to discredit them, Popper’s formulation seems insufficient for 
that which is alive and thus unpredictably complex, be it a biologist’s cell or a social 
event. Only my fear of reproducing the dichotomies I blame the nation state of enacting 
prevents me from bringing Feyerbend’s “anything goes” into the picture. 
Countering these perspectives is to get us all to appreciate that the first step to 
understanding is to first comprehend how best to interact with the information we have 
received and that to understand is a creative, pleasing, or useful interaction with the 
information in hand--such interaction is the creation of meaning.  
As Conant (1951) posited it, science is an interconnected series of concepts and 
conceptual schemes that have developed as the result of experimentation and observation 
and are fruitful for further experimentation and observation. Thus the process also 
involves abandoning the hope of finding fast solutions or writing praiseworthy 
bureaucratic reports. It involves acknowledging the intricacies of human interaction and 
networks, the intermittent nature of meaning making, and the necessary exuberance and 
deficiency of all trans-cription and trans-lation. It involves using the revealed 
Published by ICAAP Journal of Research Practice
Page 5 of 8
complexities as a lever to humble our perspectives when confronting multifaceted 
“realities.” Finally it requires getting all to realize that the anthropological quest is one 
that to become acceptable is in need not only of an epistemological change but also of a 
political one. The political change required is one which prevents its own reduction to 
convenient dichotomies and essentializations. It is a change which pervades all active 
spheres while recognizing that the practices of research constitute the relations among the 
participants and also are constituted by them in turn.  
Politics, unfortunately, is the frame the state’s institutionalized educational system hides 
systematically so as to seize and hold my students and me in the positivistic paradigm for 
life. We, all, need to work hard to further uncover the banal practices which the sovereign 
national state context utilizes to trap us in its cultural/semiotic frames. The task is similar 
to the one described by Duro for the arts: “The task of any discussion of frames and 
framing in the visual arts is first and foremost to counter the tendency of the frame to 
invisibility with respect to the artwork” (Duro, 1996, p. 1). This activity is not easy. 
Derrida, in one of his less obscure pieces, poetically points at the difficulty: 
The parergon [accessory or frame] stands out both from the ergon [the 
work] and from the milieu, it stands out first of all like a figure on a 
ground. But it does not stand out like the work. The latter also stands out 
against a ground. The parergonal frame stands out against two grounds, 
but with respect to each of these two grounds, it merges into the other. 
With respect to the work which can serve it as a ground, it merges into the 
wall, and then gradually, into general text. With respect to the ground, 
which is the general text, it merges into the work, which stands out against 
the general ground. There is always a form, on the ground, but the 
parergon is a form which has its traditional determination not that it stands 
out but that it disappears, buries itself, effaces itself, melt away at the 
moment it deploys its great energy. (Derrida, 1987, p. 57) 
The sovereign is a parergon (or frame) to present paradigmatic perspectives in the social 
sciences. They constitute each other, neither being absolutely intrinsic or extrinsic to each 
other. 
Untying the knot that connects them, overcoming the nation state’s paradigm involves 
finding ways to offer our students literacies with which to read the world--ours as well as 
any other. In Burkean terms, I want to offer them “dramatism” (Burke, 1969): the 
realization that the relationships between life and theatre are not metaphorical but real 
and that the understanding of symbolic systems holds the key to the understanding of 
social organization. This literacy requires abundant theory and rich descriptive faculties 
in order to uncover and cope with the complexity of the sites and social phenomena that 
we expect the students to interpret. Thus they need familiarity with a variety of 
disciplines and discourses. They need an economic discourse for discussing commodities, 
supplies, and management; an aesthetic discourse, to discuss architecture, advertising, 
and display; a political discourse, to discuss bodies, policies, planning, and discipline; a 
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historical discourse to talk about change in organization, consumption, and community. 
They also need interpretative discourses to articulate understandings of each of the texts 
and their necessary intertextuality in practice, which, in concert, create culture. 
All of the above are needed in order to read the world and the politics that constructs it, 
not only in the world outside but also inside the classrooms. It might not be all that is 
needed, but it is a critical step before offering solutions or directions. 
More frontal teaching of theory, even when accompanied by fieldwork, though good, 
might not be good enough. We are in urgent need of new pedagogies and educational 
strategies. We urgently need to take risks and renegotiate horizons within our own 
institutions. We are in urgent need of reshaping the academic, compartmentalized 
curriculum--the one that constitutes and is constituted by the present relations of 
academic power. To better the central tool of research in anthropology, i.e., the 
researcher, we need to reconnect students to themselves and to that which constitutes 
them in the ever-changing contexts of living. Needless to say, we the teachers need to do 
exactly the same. Doing the same might be painful and at times risky, taking chances in 
the academic world by truly engaging in dialogue while uncovering for and with our 
students how our own positions of power are constructed and maintained is no easy task, 
but from any anti-transcendental scientific perspective there seems to be no other way. It 
is not our intentions that count, though when declared they become consequential in the 
world, but our deeds. From our perspective the only possible answer to W. B. Yeats’ 
question “how can you tell the dancer from the dance?” is this: You can’t, the dancer is 
the dance. 
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